The Data Encryption Standard (DES) defines an indexed set of permutations acting on the message space M = (0,l)". If this set of permutations were closed under functional composition, then DES would be vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack that runs in 228 steps, on the average. It is unknown in the open literature whether or not DES has this weakness.
It ia important to know whether or not DES is closed since, if DES were closed, it would have the following two weaknesses. First, both sequential multiple encryption and Tuchrnan's multiple encryption scheme-the two most popular proposals for strengthening DES through using multiple encryption-would be equivalent to single encryption.' Even worse, DES would be vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack that runs in 2' ' steps, on the average. Each weakness follows from the fact that the set of cryptographic transformations of any closed cipher f o r m a group under functional composition. Although most researchers believe DES is not closed, no one has proven this conjecture in the open literature.
In this paper we present two statistical tests for determining if a finite, deterministic cryptosystem is a closed under functional composition. The Erst test is based on a "meet-in-the-middle" strategy and takes O ( a ) time and space, where K is the size of the key space. The second test follows a pseuderandom walk in the message space until a cycle is detected, using O(J?z) time and constant space. Although we focus on DES, the methods presented here are general in nature.
Using a combination of software and special-purpose hardware, we applied the cycling test to DES.
Our initial experiments revealed no algebraic weaknesses with DES.
The body of this paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 discusses the contrasting properties of closed and random ciphers. Section 3 presents two statistical closure tests. Section 4 describes how each test can be modified into a known-plaintext attack against closed ciphers. Section 5 lists our initial experimental results and explains how to interpret them. Section 6 poses several open problem, and section 7 summarizes our conclusions. An appendix, which briefly describes our implementation of the cycling test, is also included.
Definitions and Notations
A (finite, deterministic) cryptooystern is an ordered 4tuple (K, M , C,T), where K , M , and C are tinite sets called the key space, message space, and ciphertezt space, and T : K x M 4 C is a transformation such that, for each k E K , the mapping Tk = T ( k , .) is invertible. The order of a cryptosystem is the number of distinct transformations; the degree of a cryptosystem is the size of the message space. A cryptosystem is endomorphic iff the message space and ciphertext space are the same set. C.
In an endomorphic cryptosystem, each key represents a permutation on M. A cryptosystem is faithful iff every key represents a distinct transformation.
We shall use the following notations throughout the paper. For any cryptosystem ll = (K, M,C,T), let 7n = u(Tk : k E K} be the set of all encryption transformations, and let Gn = (&) be the group generated by 17. For any transformation Tk E Tn, let Ti1 denobe the inverse of Tk. In addition, let K = 1x1
be the size of the key space; let M = IMJ be the degree of ll; and let m = I T n I be the order of II. Whenever the meaning is clear, we will omit the subscript II. Let I be the identity permutation on M, and let AM and SM be, respectively, the alternating group and ayrnrnetric group on M [13] . For any permutations g, h we will denote the composition of g and h by = g(h(.) ].
An endomorphic cryptosystem is closed iff its set of encryption transformations is closed under functional composition6 Shannon's notion of a pure cipher generalizes the idea of closure to non-endomorphic cryptosystem [57] . A cryptosystem ll = (K,M,C,T) is pure iff, for every TO E T i , the set T i l l * is closed.' Every closed cryptosystem is pure, but not every endomorphic pure cryptosystem is closed (see section 2.2).
To analyze the cycling test, it is useful to introduce the following standard terminology from permutation group theory (131 [15] [16]. For any subgroup G G SH, for any z E M, the G-orbit of x is the set G-orbit(z) = {g(z) : g E G} and the G-etabilizet of z is the set G-stabilizer(%) = {g E G : g(%) = s}.
If f is any function (not necessarily a permutation) and if z E Domain(f), the f-closure ofz is the set f-closure(z) = { f ( z ) : i 2 0). For any permutation g E S M , we will sometimes write g-orbit(z) to denote the &)-orbit of 2. For any subgroup G C_ SM, the order of G is the number of elements in G; for any g E SM, the order ofg is the order of (g).
Whenever T E Sw , we say T acts transitively on M iff, for every pair of messages x , y E M, there exists 8ome transformation Tk E 1 euch that Tk(z) = y.
For any any string 8 E (0, l}*, let Z denote the bitwise complement of 3.
The Data Encryption Standard defines a particular endomorphic cryptosystem with M = C = {0,1}6' and K = {0,1}66. Because DES has degree Z6', but order at most Z56, DES is intransitive. 
A Priori Beliefs
The question of whether or not DES is closed is a question about the order of the group generated by DES.
Grossman and Coppersmith observed that GDES G AM [48] , but no one ha9 disproved the possibility that GDES = TDES.'
There are several reasons to suspect DES is not closed. First, Coppersmith and Grossman proved "DESlike" permutations generate the alternating group [48Is9 Second, if even just two permutations are chosen at random from Sw, then there is an overwhelming chance (greater than 1 -e -a ) that these permutations generate either AH or SM [12] [14]. Third, no one has announced finding any three keys i , j , k E K such that Tk = TiTj. Finally, according to a 1977 unclassified summary of a report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the National Security Agency certified that "the final DES algorithm wag, to the best of their knowledge, free of any statistical or mathematical weaknesses" [SS].
On the other hand, DES is not a set of randomly chosen permutations, and Coppersmith and Grossman did not prove that DES generates A H . Furthermore A H , note that each round of DES is an even permutation.
The last two properties, however, apparently involve only a small fraction of the total number of DES transformations. While many people may have a strong belief that DES is not closed, there is a need for convincing objective evidence to answer this question.
1.3
To Jueneman [40] studied mathematically the cycle structure of the key stream produced in output-feedback mode. Each of these studies concluded that, if DES is used in output feedback mode with a feedback-width of less than 64 bits, then the resulting key stream will cyde in about Each of these previous cycling projects studied the behavior of the powers of some indexed function 
Previous Cycling Studies on DES
after 128 bits whenever a weak key id wed.
step i the key ki is chosen as a pseudo-random function of the previous ciphertext zi-1.
Closed Ciphers versus Random Ciphers
In this section, we review several important differences between closed cryptosystems and cryptosystems that consist of randomly chosen permutations. These differences will form the basis of the statistical closure tests.12
2.1
Since every finite cancellation semigroup is a group [IS], any endomorphic cryptosystem is closed iff its set of encryption transformations forms a group under functional composition. Thus, closed ciphers have a great deal of algebraic structure. By contrast, one expects a set of randomly chosen permutations to have virtually no algebraic structure, as the following lemmas makes precise. Properties of cryptosystems can be studied both by examining abstractly the set of encryption transformations and by examining how the transformations act on the message space. Lemma 2.1 captures one important difference between closed and random ciphers by focusing on a property of the set of encryption transformations. This lemma says that if a cryptosystem is closed, then for every transformation Tk there are many pairs Ti,Tj such that Tk = TiT,; but, if a cryptosystem consists of randomly chosen permutations, then for every transformation Tk it is unlikely to find any pair Ti,Tj such that Tk = TiTj. This lemma provides the basis of the meet-in-the-middle closure test.
Lemma 2.1 Let ll = (K, M, M,T) be any endomorphic cryptosystem of order rn, and let k E K be any key. If ll is closed, then there are exactly rn pairs of keys Ti,Tj E 7 such that TiTj = Tk. If 7 is selected at random from SM, then the expected number of pairs of transformations Ti,Tj E 7 such that TiTj = Tk is rn2/M!.
Proof. Part 1:
Assume II is closed. For every transformation Ti E 7 , there is exactly one transformation Tj E 7n such that TiTj = Tk. Part 2: Assume 7n is chosen at random. There are rn2 pairs Ti,Tj E Tn and each pair has a I/ l S~l chance of corresponding to Tk. Moreover, these probabilities are independent. I
Algebraic Properties of Closed and Random Ciphers
For unfaithful cryptosystems, it is important to distinguish between drawing a transformation from the set of transformations and picking a representation of a transformation from the keyspace. Mathematically, it is usually more convenient to think about selecting a transformation from a set of transformations, but in practice, one must often select a transformation by choosing a key. Let 7 be the set of cryptographic transformations in any cryptosystem with keyspace K. If T k is selected from 7 at random, then the probability of picking any particular transformation in 7 is exactly l/m, where i n = 171. However, if a key k is selected at random from K, then the probability that k represents any particular transformation in 7 is between l / m and 1 / K , where K = IKI. If the underlying cryptosystem is unfaithful, then m < If.
The next lemma describes the structure imposed on the message space by any closed cipher; spe~ificall~, lemma 2.2 says that the orbits of any closed cipher partition the message space into transitive sets. This The next lemma calculates the expected number of spurious decipherments of closed and random ciphers; this lemma is useful in the analysis of the tests. 
Closed Ciphers: Two Examples
One interesting example of a closed cipher is a single-key variation of the RSA cryptosystem [SS] in which the same modulus is used for every key. Only the encryption exponent varies. In this cryptosystem, the modulus n is chosen to be the product of two large primes p , q . The message space is the multiplicative group modulo n, and the key space is the set of all integers 1 < e < 4(n) such that e has a multiplicative inverse moddo 4(n), where +(n) = (p-l)(q-1) is the totient function. The encryption function is defined by TC,,,(z! = z' mod n. It is easy to verify that this cryptosystem is closed.
Although this variation of RSA is vulnerable to the known-plaintext attacks described in this paper, t b s e attacks are less efficient at breaking the cryptosystem than are known factoring techniques [23]. We view this example as evidence that, provided the key space is large enough to withstand an O ( a ) time and space attack, c l d ciphers are not necessarily insecure. Of course, the security of thm variation of RSA remains to be further evaluated [49] .
Simple substitution [SO] is also a closed cipher. Note that the restriction of simple substitution where the letter 'A' is always mapped to 'B' is an endomorphic system that is pure but not closed.
Statistical Closure Tests
In this section we describe two statistical tests for determining if an indexed set of permutations T generates a small group. Each test tries to distinguish between the two competing hypotheses: "7 is closed" and "7 was selected at random-m Both tests are based heavily on the Birthday Paradox.
The Birthday Paradax
The Birthday Paradox [6] involves the question, "If r people are selected at random, what is the chance that no two people will have the same birthday?" If birthdays are independently and uniformly distributed between 1 and m, then the answer to this question is about pr = 1 -(i), since there are (5) pairs of people and each pair has a l / m chance of having the same birthday. This approximate analysis, however, ignores the possibility that more than two people might have the same birthday. The 'paradox" is that many students are surprised to learn that the probability pr is so low: with only r = 6 people, the clqance is about .5 that at least two people will have the same birthday.
More exactly, 
Meet-in-theMiddle Closure Test
The meebin-the-middle dosure test is based on lemma 2.1 and the Birthday Paradox: given any endomorphic cryptosyatem ll = (K, M , M,T), pick any key k E K and search for keys a, b E K such that Tk = TbTa. If ll is closed, then such a pair of keys a, I can be efficiently found, on the average. If T were selected at random, then it is unlikely to find any such pair.
To search for a pair of keys a,b E K such that Tk = TbT,, we use a standard 'rneet-in-th*middle" attack similar to that described in is c l o d , thk procedure will find a match TI = TbT, with probability qr 2 1 -, ' * I K .
The situation is a variation of the Birthday Paradox in which we are drawing two samples X and Y , each of size r, from an urn containing m elements. We are interested in the probability that the samples overlap. If ll is faithful, each element ia drawn with probability exactly 1 / K ; otherwise, each element is drawn with probability at least 1/K. If T was chosen at random, then, for any Th E 7 , we would expect T to contain a pair T,, Tb E T such that Tk = TbT, with probability at most K Z / M ! I 0. By choosing r = c f i with C sufficiently large, we can make the probability qr Y 1 - 
If
of finding a match as large as desired.
Cycling Closure.Test
Given any endomorphic cryptosystem It = ( K , M, M,T), the cycling test takes a pseuderandom walk in Gn, the group generated by ll. By To prevent the induced walk in MI from cycling before the main walk in Gn cycles, the integer I must be chosen sufficiently large. For DES, 1 = 1 suffices, since DES has many more messages than keys.
To enable the cycle length of the walk to be computed efficiently and exactly, take a deterministic pseudo-random walk rather than a truly random walk. In particular, for i = 1 , 2 , . . . , choose the key ki 88 a pseuderandom function of %;-I. For i = 1,2 ,... , let = Tk(&o), where ki = p ( % ; -l ) for some deterministic pseuderandom function p : M' + K. Finally, to detect cycles and to compute the lengths of cycles and their leaders, use the efficient algorithms described by Sedgewick and Seymanski [27] that generalize the well-known "two-finger" algorithm due to Floyd [20] . The validity of the cycling test depends in part on the extent to which the pseudo-randxn walk behaves like a truly random walk. To increase one's confidence that the pseudo-random function does not interact with the cryptosystem in a way that would invalidate the statistical analysis, we recommend that each trial of the experiment be repeated with several different types of pseuderandom functions." (See section 5.2 and Appendix A for a description of the particular pseudo-random functions used in our experiments.)
In other words, the cycling closure test picks an initial message zo at random and computes the The second test is similar in spirit to Pollard's pfactoring method [22] [18]. It is also similar to but different from the algorithm discovered by Sattler and Schnorr for determining the order of any element in any finite group that has an efficient multiplication procedure [25] . The cycling test differs from the cycling experiments performed by Gait If Tn is chosen at random, then the walk in Gn induces a pseudo-random walk in M'. If r = cMIIZ for some constant c > 0, then the chance that the induced walk in M' cycles within r steps is only about For the case that II is closed, it helpful to model the pseuderandom walk 81,$z,. . . in Cn as a discrete finite Markov Process with a K x K transition matrix A. For each 1 2 i , j 5 K, the (i,j)th entry q j of A denotes the probability of selecting i; next, given that i, was the last selected transformation. Each pseudo-random selection depends only on the immediately preceding state. If II is faithful, then each entry of A is exactly 1/K; otherwise, each entry of A is at least 1/K. In either case, the probability of a pseudo-random walk not cycling within r steps is at most (K)r/Kr.
The second test computm a statistic w = X + p , where X and p are respectively the leader length and cycle length of a particular pseuderandom walk in M', starting at some randomly selected point 20. The value of this statistic depends on the size of the Gn-orbit of 20. If II is closed, then by lemma 2.2 this orbit contains at most K messages. However, if Tn is chosen at random, then with very high confidence the Gn-orbit of zo is M'. Therefore, if II is closed, the expected value of w is at most approximately n; but, if 7n is chosen at random, then the expected value of w is approximately M'lz. For DES with 1 = 1, the expected value of w is about ZZ8 if DES is closed and about 2" if TL)ES is chosen at random.
It is possible for the random walk to cycle prematurely if certain special keys are chosen during the walk. For example, the cycle will close if a pair of semi-weak keys are chosen one after the other, or, if By picking any TO E T and by applying the test to T i ' T , the cycling test can be used to test for purity as well.
Known-Plaintext Attacks against Closed Ciphers
Each of the closure tests can be used with only slight modifications as a known-plaintext attack against any closed cipher. The input to each attack is a short sequence (PI, cl), (p2, 4,. . . , ( P I , ci) of matched plaintext/ciphertext pairs derived from the same secret key k. With high probability each attack finds a representation of Tk as a product of two or more transformations. The cryptanalyst can use this representation of Tk to decrypt additional ciphertexts also encrypted under the same key k. This attack does not find k.
Meet-in-the-Middle Known-Plaintext Attack
The meet-in-the-middle test first picks any message p and any key k at random and then computes the ciphertext c = Th(p). Next, the test searches for a pair of keys a, b such that Tk = TbT,. Alternately, a cryptanalyst could begin with any matched plaintext/ciphertext pair @, c) that was encrypted using some unknown key k, and then search for a representation of the secret transformation Tk as a product TaT4.
This attack requires U ( a ) time and apace on the average.
Cycling Knuwn-Plaintext Attack
The cycling test also yields a known-plaintext attack. Given a matched plaintext/ciphertext pair ( p , C ) that was encrypted under some secret key k, the cryptanalyst computes two pseudo-random walks of the type used in the cycling test, starting from messages p and c. The same pseudo-random function is used for each of the walks. If the attacked cryptosystem is closed, then, since p and c lie in the same orbit, with very high probability the two pseudo-random walks will intersect within about steps. Since the same deterministic pseudo-random function is used for each of the walks, once the two walks intersect, they will forever follow exactly the same path and will therefore drain into the same cycle. By running the Sedgewick/Szymanski [27] cycle-detection algorithm for each of the pseudo-random walks, and by sharing the same memory for both algorithms, it is easy to find a specific point at which the walks intersect, provided the walks intersect. The two walks can be computed sequentially or simultaneously.
Thus, the cycling test gives a way to generate two sequences of keys 01~02,. . . ,a; and b1, bz, , . . , bj such that g ( p ) = h(c) = hTk(p), where g = TaiT4i-l .-.T4, and h = TbjTbj-l ..eTbl. With high probability, Tk = h-'g, which can be statistically verified by applying h-'g to additional matched plaintext/ciphertext pairs. If Tk # h-'g, then the entire procedure can be repeated on the next plaintext/ciphertext pair.
To decrypt each additional ciphertext CO, the cryptanalyst computes TL'(c0) = g-'h(co). To compute h in constant space is errsy-aimply generate the sequence of keys b1, bz, . . . , b, by retracing the pseudorandom walk starting from c . The difficulty is to compute g-' in a time-and space-efficient manner. The problem is that each pseudo-random walk is a "one-way walk" in the sense that reversing any step of the walk requires inverting the encryption function.
One could save each of the keys a ' , a*,. . . ,q, but that would require O ( i ) space, where i is the length of the walk starting at p . If the attacked cryptosystem is closed, then i will be about a, on the average.
On the other hand, one could reverse any step of the walk in constant space by retracing the the walk from the beginning, but this procedure would yield an O ( i 2 ) time algorithm for computing g-'. Chandra shows that a range of timespace tradeoffs can be used to solve this type of problem. In particular, for any c > 0, it is possible to compute g-' in constant space and time i1+6 [19] . Therefore, if the attacked cryptosystem is closed then, for any 6 > 0, the cycling known-plaintext attack can be carried out in constant space and time 0 (K('+')/'), on the average.
4.3
Each of the known-plaintext attacks can be applied to any finite, deterministic cryptosystem by launching the attack against the group generated by the cryptosystem. For this reason, it is very important to know the order of the group generated by DES.
Since DES's relatively small key space of 256 keys allows no margin of safety even for 1977 technology j35], these attacks would be a devastating weakness for DES, if DES generated a small group. In particular, if DES were closed, a personal computer equipped with special-purpose hardware could decrypt DES ciphertexts under a known-plaintext attack in less than two hours, on the average (See appendix A).
Application of Attacks to DES

Experimental Results
This section explains how to interpret the results of the statistical closure tests and summarizes the initial results we obtained by applying the cycling test to DES.
Interpreting the Experimental Results
Each statistical test gives a method for collecting evidence that can be used to compute a measure of our relative degree of belief in the foLlowing two competing hypotheses:
0 HG = "DES is a group." HR = "Each DES transformation was chosen independently with uniform probability from the symmetric group on M."
To compute this measure, we will apply the theory of the weight of cuidencc, BS explained by Good i9l (71.
Each test is asymmetrical in the sense that it allows us to compute the conditional probabilities -P(E I HGland P(E I HE), but not P(E I G) nor P(E I HR), where E is experimental evidence and HG and HR are the complements of HG and HR respectively. This means that, on the bask of experimental evidence, we would be able to conclude only that DES is not closed or that DES has a structure different from that expected from a set of randomly chosen permutations; we would not be able to conclude that DES is dosed. In the worst case, DES could be closed, except for some isolated pair of keys a , 6 such that TbT, is not in 7 , even though there exists some key k and some message zo such that TbT0(z) = Ti(z)
for all measages z E M, z # ZO.
Initially, each person may have some (subjective) degrees of belief P(HG) and P(HR) i n hypothese HG and HR respectively. From these initial degrees of belief, each person can compute O(HC/HR) = P(HG)/P(HR) as his or her initial odds in favor of Hc over HR. After seeing any experiment4 evidence E, however, each rational person should update his or her own odds in favor of Hc over HE.
Given any evidence E, each believer in the theory of the weight of evidence should update his or her odds in favor of HG over HR 89 follows:
where O(HG/HR I E) is the odds in favor of HG as opposed to HR given E.
favor of Hc over HR.
In light of the our experimental evidence, we encourage each reader to update his or her own odds in
Summary of Experimental Results
On April 4, 1985 , we completed the first trial of the cycling test, detecting a cycle of length nearly 2=. For this test, we chose the pseudc-random function to be the 'identity" pr~jection.'~ Starting with the initial message 20 = 0123 4567 89-CDEF (in hexadecimal notation), we found a cycle of length exactly p = 7,985,051,916 with a leader of length X = 34,293,589.. As one test of the correctness of our computations, we ran a software implementation of the cycling test for 30,000 steps. The software and hardware implementations of the cycling test agreed on all values. As a second test of correctness, we repeated the initial experiment and obtained identical results.
This single experiment gives strong evidence that DES is not closed. Let E denote the evidence from our experiment. Since p+A FJ = 2 a = 3 2 a , it follows that P(E 1 H c ) / P ( E I HR) u e-32af2/e-'a~2 = c-~". Therefore, each reader should decrease his or her odds in favor of Hc over HR by a factor of about e-610
During May through August 1985, we performed additional trials of the cycling closure test as well other cycling experiments on DES. Results of these experiments were described at the Crypto 85 conference [41]. All additional trials of the cycling closure test supported our initial findings.
Open Problems
Although our experiments give strong statistical evidence that DES is not closed, numeroua interesting questions remain unanswered. We begin with several questions about the algebraic structure of DES. Does DES generate AM? What ia the order of the group generated by DES? What is the group generated by DES? For how many keys i , j, k is it true that T, = T;Tj?
Is DES faithful? What is the order of DES?
What subsets of DES transformations generate small groups? (Note that each weak key represents a transformation that generates the cyclic group of order 2.)
Is DES Lornogeneow in the sense that for every k E K it is true that TL1 E T? For how many k E K is it true that TLf E T ?
Is I E T?
Knowing whether or not I E T D E s ia interesting-not because this property would necessarily be a weakness in DES-but because this question would answer several other questions about DES. By the complementation property, for any key k, T k = I implies TpI. Hence Each of the known-plaintext attacks finds a representation of the secret transformation T k a a product of two or more transformations. In practice, it would suffice to find an approximate representation of Tk.
To this end, we could say that two permutations Tl,Tz E 7 are q-approzimotcly equd on X C M iff, for all z E X, T~(z) and Tz(z) always agree on at least q bits.
For each 1 5 q 5 64, for how many keys i , j, k is it true that Tk is q-approzimatety equd to TiTj on M ?
0 What other notions of 'approximately equal'' transformations would be useful in finding approximate representations?
Since the closure tests do not depend on the detailed definition of DES, it is natural to ask:
More specifically, we used the projection that removes each of the eight parity bits.
1b
What can be proven from the detailed definition of DES about the order of the group generated by DES?
Are there more powerful statistical closure tests than the two tests presented in this paper that are based on the detailed definition of DES?
Our research dso raises questions involving the design of cryptosystems.
Is it possible to build asecure, practical cryptosystem for which it can be proven that the cryptosystem generates either AH or SA? (See [48] for one suggestion.)
Is it possible to hide a trapdoor in a cryptosystem by concealing a secret set of generators for a small group? (Note that it does not work simply to have a large subset of the transformations generate a small group, since the enemy could guess a small number of transformations in the subset and apply the cycling closure test to the guessed transformations.)
We presented two known-plaintext attacks against closed ciphers, but other attacks may also exist.
What attacks are possible against closed ciphers? How can knowledge of the specific group help?
Finally, it would be interesting to apply the closure tests to variations of DES that exaggerate certain types of possible weaknesses in the standard.
What is the order of "crippled" DES transformations formed by reducing the number of rounds or by replacing one or more of the S-boxes with linear mappings?
Summary
We have presented two statiatical tests for determining whether or not any finite, deterministic cryptosystern generates a small group. Each test yields a known-plaintext attack against closed cryptosystems.
Our experiments show, with a high degree of confidence, that DES does not generate a small group. These results should incresse our confidence in the security of using DES with multiple encryption. However, since cryptosystema that generate large groups are not necessarily secure, our experiments say only that DES does not fail in one extreme way.
This work leaves open the possibility of proving that DES is not closed directly from the detailed definition of DES.
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A A Fast Implementation of the Cycling Closure Test
To test the DES for closure, we designed and built special-purpose hardware for an IBM PC. Our experiment required special-purpose hardware for two reasons: we needed to compute about 2" encryptions16 and we needed to change the key at each step."
The special-purpose hardware is a custom wire-wrap board for an IBM personal computer," containing a microprogrammed finitestate controller and an AMD Am28068 DES chip [52] . Data paths connect the DES chip, a 16-byte ciphertext buffer, a PROM computing the next-key function, and the hoet computer (see figure 1) . The next-key function in computed byte-by-byte. A read-write counter indicatea the number of consecutive mesaages to compute. To increase the board's flexibility, the microprogram is stored in RAM accessible to the host computer. The PROM can be easily replaced to implement different next-key functions.
We perform cycle detection in two passes: data acquisition and analysis. During data acquisition, the host computer stores every ZZ0th mesaage on a floppy disk. During analysis, these messages are loaded into main memory, and up to 2'' consecutive messages are computed and compared to those already present. would require about a day and a half. Running the tmt for Zaa *tap would take at l a v t 16 time8 longer.
"Commercially available DES boardo a m not suited for our p u r p w . To compute and load a new key for each encryption would require interaction by the h o d computer, introducing tremendou overhead.
We choae to urn an IBM P C b a a u s e an IBM PC waa available to UI, and becausa it is eary to attach special-purpose hardware to an IBM PC [ 5 4 .
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